Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: The Application of the Actual Malice Standard to Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Bentley, Alicia J.
Case Comments
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: The Application of the
Actual Malice Standard to Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are offensive to some of
their hearers."' The constitutional protection provided by the first amendment,
however, is not absolute2 and does not protect certain categories of communications
such as defamation, 3 obscenity, 4 or incitement. 5 In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,6 the
Supreme Court held that a public figure who was the subject of an offensive parody
could not recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless he or
she established that the underlying publication contained a false statement of fact and
that the defendant acted with "actual malice." 7 These two requirements guarantee
the defendant the same level of first amendment protection whether the plaintiff
pleads defamation or emotional distress.
This Comment focuses on the first amendment protection accorded media de-
fendants who are sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It begins by
examining the recent Supreme Court decision which applied the actual malice standard
to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Second, it considers the
protection provided by the actual malice standard in defamation actions. Third, the
expanding use of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort against media
defendants is evaluated. Fourth, intentional infliction of emotional distress and def-
amation claims are distinguished. Finally, this Comment concludes by evaluating the
Supreme Court's decision and its possible effect on first amendment jurisprudence.
II. HUSTLER MAGAZINE V. FAZwELL
In the November 1983 issue of Hustler magazine, Larry Flynt first published an
"ad parody" featuring the Reverend Jerry Falwell. 8 The parody of a Campari
Liqueur advertisement fictitiously portrayed Falwell as a drunken hypocrite who had
an unnatural relationship with his mother.9 As a result, Falwell sued Flynt and
1. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,592 (1968) (Harlan, J.). See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 910 (1982) ("[s]peech does not lose its protected character... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action"); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (even "the most repulsive speech enjoys [the]
immunity" provided by the first amendment (citing Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966))).
2. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) ("not all speech is
of equal First Amendment importance").
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
7. See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
8. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876
(1988). In March 1984, after Falwell had filed his lawsuit, Flynt republished the parody in Hustler magazine. Id. at 1273.
9. Id. at 1272. Falwell distributed edited copies of the parody to his religious supporters in order to raise money.
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Hustler magazine for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.10 The Virginia district court dismissed the invasion of privacy
claim11 and the jury found for the defendant on the libel claim, stating that no
reasonable person would believe that the parody was true. 12 However, the jury
awarded Falwell $100,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for
his emotional distress claim.13
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the actual malice standard
applied to Falwell's claim because of his status as a public figure and because the
gravamen of the claim was tortious publication. 14 The court of appeals stated that the
defendants were "entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received in Falwell's claim for
libel."' 5 However, the Fourth Circuit held that in emotional distress claims, "when
the first amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the standard
is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or reckless misconduct has
proximately caused the injury complained of." 16 Thus, the appellate court upheld the
jury's 'finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the award of
damages. 17
In a closely split decision, the Fourth Circuit rejected Flynt's request for a
rehearing en banc. 18 Dissenting from this denial, Judge Wilkinson concluded that
since Falwell's libel claim had failed, his intentional infliction of emotional distress
action must also fail, "for the constitutional principles of freedom of expression
preclude attaching adverse consequences to utterances other than defamatory
falsehoods." 19 Stating that "distortion and discomforture" were the goals of satire,
the dissent concluded that political satire should be immune from intentional
infliction of emotional distress liability. 20 Judge Wilkinson denied that "those in
political life should ever be able to recover damages for no other reason than hurt
feelings .... "21 Given the often unpleasant nature of political debate, political
The Ninth Circuit held this use of Flynt's copyrighted material constituted "fair use." Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
I1. Id. at 1278. Falwell cross-appealed on the privacy issue, claiming that the use of "his name and likeness" in
an ad parody constituted "use for the purposes of trade." Id. The Fourth Circuit held that since the parody was "not
reasonably believable and . . . contained a disclaimer," it did not constitute "use for the purposes of trade," and,
therefore, did not violate Falwell's statutory right to privacy under Virginia law. Id.
12. Id. at 1273. Since the parody was not reasonably believable, it did not damage Falwell's reputation. Therefore,
there was no libel. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1274. Throughout the appeal neither party disputed the conclusion that Falwell was a public figure.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 n.5 (1988). See infra note 22.
15. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986).
16. Id. at 1275. The United States Supreme Court summarized the court of appeals holding as "so long as the
utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict emotional distress, it is of no
constitutional import whether the statement was a statement of fact or an opinion or whether it was true or false." Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988).
17. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1986).
18. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986).
19. Id. at 485 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 65, 73 (1964), and Greenbelt
Co-op. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970)).
20. Id. at 487.
21. Id. at 484.
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figures22 should not be able to maintain a cause of action for emotional distress which
occurs in their chosen profession. 23 The dissent concluded that the proper remedy for
Flynt's offensive attack on Falwell was not legal action, but rather free discussion in
the marketplace of ideas.2 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit holding "that
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact, which was
made with 'actual malice'. . . .'25 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist declined to "find that a State's interest in protecting public figures from
emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is
patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury . . . when that speech
could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public
figures involved." ' 26 The opinion focused on the societal importance of "the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern." 2 7 Such robust
political debate, even when it consists of "vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks" on public figures, is protected by the first amendment.28
Rehnquist also discussed the unique role of political cartoons in the history of public
and political debate. While admitting that Flynt's ad parody was "at best a distant
cousin . . . and a rather poor relation at that" of even the most caustic political
cartoons, the Chief Justice stated that there was no principled, objective test to
separate the types of satire.29 He concluded that the "outrageousness" standard used
in intentional infliction of emotional distress claims was too subjective a standard to
justify a distinction because it focused on the speech's emotional impact on its
subject.30 Although in some circumstances the impact of speech may provide grounds
for its regulation, 3' the protection provided by the first amendment does not disappear
merely because the speech is offensive or upsetting. 32 Thus, the Court did not hold
that speech which intentionally inflicts emotional distress is per se unprotected
speech. 33 The Supreme Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility of inten-
22. Id. at 485. Judge Wilkinson found Falwell to be more than a public figure because of the role Falwell had
assumed in politics. Therefore, the judge decided that Falwell stood "on the same footing as a public official." Id.
23. Id. at 485-86.
24. Id. at 487-88.
25. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988). See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 879. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision as the case was argued before he joined the Court.
Id. at 883. Justice White filed a two-sentence concurring opinion. Id.
27. Id. at 879.
28. Id. at 880 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). "One of the prerogatives
of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men .... Id. at 880 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 332
U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
29. Id. at 881.
30. Id. at 881-82 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)) "An 'outrageousness'
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may
have an adverse emotional impact on the audience." Id. at 882.
31. Id. at 882. E.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limiting radio broadcast of offensive
speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (allowing punishment for use of "fighting words").
32. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988).
33. In first amendment analysis, the most important (and perhaps only) balancing of interests occurs when the court
determines whether the communication constitutes "speech" within the meaning of the first amendment and, thus, is
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tional infliction of emotional distress liability based on an offensive publication. A
public figure, such as Falwell, could recover damages for emotional distress if, in
addition to establishing the elements of the emotional distress cause of action, that
plaintiff also shows that the publication was a false statement of fact which was made
with actual malice. 34 Since the jury found that the ad parody was not believable and
therefore did not contain false statements of fact, 35 it was constitutionally immune
from intentional infliction of emotional distress liability, as well as defamation
liability.
Justice White filed a very brief concurrence. While agreeing that the "penal-
ization [of] the publication of the parody cannot be squared with the First
Amendment," he felt that the majority's discussion of the actual malice standard was
unnecessary, 36 as the jury found that the parody was not factual. Thus, the Court
unanimously overturned the district court's finding of liability and award of damages.
III. DEFAMATION, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND AcruAL MALICE
A. Defamation: A Brief Examination of a Constitutionalized Tort
Defamation is the publication of a false statement of fact that "so harms the
reputation of another as to lower him [or her] in the estimation of the community or
to deter third parties from associating with him [or her]." 37 At common law, the only
remedies for the publication38 of false and defamatory matters were actions for libel
or slander, 39 which were strict liability torts.40 The statement was presumed to be
false, which placed the burden on the defendant of proving that it was true and,
entitled to protection. This "definitional balancing" contrasts with the usual "ad hoc balancing" of the litigants' interests
for the purpose of determining who should prevail at trial. See generally NstmiR ON FREEDoM OF SPEEcH § 2.03 (1984 &
Supp. 1988).
34. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
37. REsrATstartr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
38. In defamation law, "publication" is a term of art and a necessary element of a defamation cause of action. Id.
at § 577 (1976). Publication occurs when the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a person
other than the one defamed. Id.
39. Part of the historical tangle of defamation law is the distinction between libel and slander. Libel is written
defamation. It was both a crime and a tort developed by the early common law courts. Oral defamation is slander. It
originated in the medieval ecclesiastical courts. Today, the distinction focuses on the permanence of the form of
communication. Permanent forms of defamation are libel, while transitory defamation is slander. L. ELDEoE, TE LAw
OF DEFAMATION § 12 (1978).
40. Id. at § 5.
For well over a thousand years Anglo-American law provided some measure of protection for one's good name.
For example, the laws of Alfred, which were probably compiled in the late ninth century, provided that one
found guilty of public slander be punished by "no lighter penalty than the cutting off of his tongue." ... By
the sixteenth century, when the common law courts began to express an interest in allowing monetary
compensation for defamation, the procedure of these courts was rigidly well-defined by a complex system of
pleading with strict technical rules. Defamation came into the common law in the form of an action on the case;
this meant that the damage caused to the person defamed was the principle purpose of the action, rather than
the injury which led to this damage. Because the law considered the damage and not the injury, special rules
of pleading and proving damages were developed.... Thus, the law of defamation.., is an unhappy tangle
of illogical rules derived from its haphazard historical development.
Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted).
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therefore, not actionable. 4' Furthermore, presumed damages were permitted because
of the difficulty in proving actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation. 42
The common law system of protecting an individual's reputation directly
conflicted with the first amendment's prohibition of laws which "abridg[e] the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . -43 Inevitably the United States Supreme
Court was forced to reconcile the opposing interests of individual reputation and free
speech. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,44 the Court held that the first amendment
prohibited a public official from recovering any damages for defamation based on
criticism of official conduct unless the official proved the statement was made with
actual malice.45 In order to meet the actual malice standard, the plaintiff was required
to establish, with convincing clarity, 46 that the defendant published the defamatory
material with knowledge of its falsity or acted with reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the publication. 47 The development of the actual malice standard was an
attempt "to strike a balance between 'vigorous debate on the political issues . . .
while at the same time affording protection to the reputation of individuals.'"48 The
purpose of the actual malice requirement was to prevent any "chilling" of speech due
to publishers' fears of defamation liability for inadvertant factual misstatements. 49
The Sullivan decision was the beginning of the constitutionalization of the tort of
defamation. 50
41. RESTATmENT OF TORTS § 613(2)(a) (1938).
42. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 394 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). In claims for libel per se
and slander per se, the plaintiff could recover without alleging or proving any harm. A defamatory statement constitutes
libel per se when the statement is clearly defamatory on its face and extrinsic evidence of its defamatory meaning is
unnecessary. A slanderous statement is actionable per se when it imputes to the plaintiff any of the following: a criminal
offense, a contagious disease, a lack of fitness for a chosen profession, trade, or calling, or unchastity (of a female
plaintiff). See ELDREDGE, supra note 39, §§ 16-19 (1978). With some minor variations, these standards have been
codified in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 569-74 (1976).
43. The complete text of the first amendment reads "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; of abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that a civil rights
advertisement in the New York Times had libeled him by implying that he was responsible for a wave of police terror
against civil rights activitists. Id. at 256-57.
45. Id. at 279-80. "'Actual malice' is a term of art, created to provide a convenient shorthand expression for the
standard of liability that must be established before a state may constitutionally permit a public official to recover for libel
actions brought against publishers." Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 (1974). As the term actual
malice is used throughout this Comment, it does not mean ill-will against the defamed.
46. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). The plaintiff must demonstrate actual malice
with convincing clarity at each stage of the proceeding, including the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
47. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). This placed the burden of proving falsity on the
plaintiff and was contrary to the common law. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
48. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 (1979)). Justice Brennan stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964):
Thus we consider this case against a backdrop of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials .... [Eirroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and.., it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing
space that they need ... to survive."
Id. at 270-72 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. The factual misstatements in the New York Times advertisement were minimal. Id. at 258-59.
50. Previously, defamation law was solely an issue of state tort law. The Sullivan decision was entirely unexpected.
The attorney representing the Montgomery Police Commissioner later stated, "I had confidently predicted that the only
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Originally, only public officials were required to prove actual malice in order to
recover damages for defamatory publications concerning their official conduct.5'
Later, the Supreme Court expanded the Sullivan holding and required public figures
also to prove actual malice.5 2 Persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions, or by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large," are considered to be public figures.5 3 Due to the wide
access to the media which public plaintiffs enjoy and the importance of open debate
on public issues,5 4 both public officials and public figures now are required to prove
actual malice in defamation actions. 55
Because the state's interest in protecting the reputations of private individuals
outweighs the first amendment interest in avoiding the "chilling" effect on free
speech, private plaintiffs must meet a significantly lower burden than that of actual
malice.5 6 Any person who does not fall within the definition of public official or public
figure need not establish actual malice in order to recover damages for defamation.5 7
The standard of liability for private plaintiffs in defamation actions is an issue of state
law.5 8 Each state has wide latitude in adopting its own standard of proof in defamation
actions brought by private persons. 59 At least in publications concerning matters of
way the Court could decide against me was to change 100 years or more of libel law. That is precisely what the Court
did." Address by M. Roland Nachman, Jr., New York Times v. Sullivan Libel Litigation Symposium, in New York City
(Mar. 9, 1984), reprinted in Nmv YORK TrtS V. Suwvurm THE NEXr Twuer YEARS 117 (R. Winfield ed. 1984).
51. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
52. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974). Plaintiffs found to be public figures include a
nationally known college football coach, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); a retired general and
political activist, Associated Press v. Walker, decided with Curds Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and a
nationally known fundamentalist minister and political commentator, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
Plaintiffs not found to be public figures include a prominent attorney, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
a socialite involved in a divorce, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); and a researcher who received a federal
grant, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). For an in-depth analysis of public figure status see B. SANroeR,
LiBEL & PRivAcy: THE PREVENTION A D DEransE OF LmIATION §§ 7.3-.72 (1985).
54. The imposition of the actual malice burden on public plaintiffs was justified by two rationales. First, public
plaintiffs enjoy greater access'to the media, which provides them with the opportunity to contradict the defamatory
statement. Second, since many public plaintiffs attain their status voluntarily, they are thought to assume the risk of media
exposure. R. SMOLLA, Tst LAw OF DEFAmATIoN §§ 2.05-.06 (1986). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
55. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Wolston v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S.
157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Moniter
Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 347; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). The majority
of states use a negligence standard, while a small minority of states require private plaintiffs to prove actual malice. For
a comprehensive list see SMoLLA, supra note 54, §§ 3.10-11 (1986).
59. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
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public interest, 60 liability cannot be established without some finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant. 6'
While false statements of fact are not protected by the first amendment, 62 "there
is no such thing as a false idea.''63 Rather than permit judicial punishment of
"pernicious" opinions, all opinions are protected in order to encourage free
discussion of opinions. 64 In evaluating ideas and opinions, "the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the market[place of ideas] . . . . "65
The test for determining which statements are facts and which are opinions has not
been definitively established. 66 However, once a statement is labeled an opinion, it
is entitled to absolute protection under the first amendment and cannot be the basis
of defamation liability. 67
Once defamation liability has been established, the defendant is responsible for
the actual injury to the plaintiff's reputation. 68 Actual injury in a defamation cause
of action is not limited to harm to reputation and community standing, but in-
cludes "personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. ' 69 In Time, Inc. v.
60. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), a plurality of the Court rejected a standard
based on the media/nonmedia status of the defendant and partially returned to the public interest/private interest
dichotomy originally established in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), overruled by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). However, this dichotomy has been applied only to suits by private plaintiffs. An
example of a private person/public issue case was the defamation suit brought by an attorney (private person) who was
representing the family of a man killed by a police officer (public issue). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (where newspaper publishes statement
on matter of public concern, private plaintiff cannot recover damages without showing statement was false). In such a
case, liability could not be established without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). An example
of a private person/private issue case was the defamation suit brought by a construction company (private "person") for
a highly inaccurate credit report (private issue). See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). The Court did not decide whether a private plaintiff in a private issue defamation case was required to prove even
negligence. See id. at 770 (White, J., concurring) (White believed that the plurality opinion did not require a showing of
negligence.). See also id. at 775-76, 780-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan felt that the plurality opinion required
the plaintiff to show negligence on the part of the defendant.).
61. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court reasoned that strict liability would have
been too rigorous a standard in light of the frst amendment. Id. at 347-48. Plaintiff also has the burden of establishing
actual injury. Id. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
62. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974).
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
64. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65. Id. "[L]et [those who subscribe to contrary views] stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which
error of opinion may be tolerated where reason Is left free to combat it." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
n.8 (1974) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugural Address).
66. For an in-depth exposition of the different fact/opinion tests, see the series of opinions in Olman v. Evans &
Novack, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Judge Starr, writing for the
majority, used a totality of the circurnstamces test to determine whether a statement was fact or opinion. Id. at 979. The
test considered four factors: (1) the common usage and meaning of specific language; (2) the verifiability of the statement;
(3) the context in which the statement was made; and (4) the broader social context of the statement. Id. at 979-84.
67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). The private person/public person dichotomy does
not apply to opinions since they are absolutely protected.
68. REsTAT M_Err (SEcoND) OF TouRs § 621 (1976). Damages for reputational injuries include nominal damages,
general damages for harm to the plaintiff's reputation and community standing, and special damages for mental suffering
and resulting bodily harm. Id. at §§ 620-23. General damages include presumed damages. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text. Actual injury is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof and the basis of compensatory damages. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
69. Id. at 350. Despite the actual injury requirement of Gertz, presumed damages arguably are still awardable. Id.
See, e.g., Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988).
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Firestone,70 a private plaintiff who alleged no harm to her reputation established
actual injury by her claims of humiliation and emotional suffering.7' Thus, the
recoverable damages in a defamation claim include parasitic damages for the
emotional distress caused by the defamatory publication, 72 as well as traditional
awards for reputational injury. 73
The constitutionalization of the tort of defamation also affected the awardability
of punitive damages. Despite their potential chilling effect, the Supreme Court never
has held that the award of punitive damages, even for public officials and public
figures, is unconstitutional. 74 Public plaintiffs are required to show actual malice in
order to have any recovery, including punitive damage awards. 75 A private plaintiff
seeking recovery for a defamatory publication concerning a public issue76 may not
recover punitive damages or presumed damages77 without a showing of actual
malice. 78 However, actual malice is not required for a private plaintiff suing for
"private issue" defamation to receive punitive damages. 79
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Recently, plaintiffs in defamation actions have included claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress 80 and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 8' The
increasing number of emotional distress claims against media defendants suggests
that the plaintiffs, who essentially are suing for defamation, are using emotional
distress claims for access to a media defendant otherwise protected by the actual
malice requirement. 82 A person is liable for the severe emotional distress caused by
70. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
71. Id. at 459-61.
72. SANFoRD, supra note 53, § 9.6.3 (1985). In contrast, some states require proof of reputational harm in order
to recover damages for emotional distress. See Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 933
(1983); Grimes v. Carter, 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966); Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301,
93 A.2d 292 (1952); Greenlee v. Coffman, 185 Iowa 1092, 171 N.W. 580 (1919); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232
Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982); France v. St. Clare's Hosp., 83 A.D.2d 1, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79, (1981); Waite v.
Stockgrowers' Credit Corp., 63 N.D. 763, 249 N.W. 910 (1933). For a general discussion of emotional damage awards
in defamation actions see ELDRaGE, supra note 39, § 95 (1978).
73. See supra note 68. See also REsrATrMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 620-23 (1976).
74. Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (punitive damages in
defamations are per se unconstitutional).
75. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See supra notes 44-55 and
accompanying text.
76. See supra note 60.
77. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
78. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
79. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). See supra note 60.
80. Drechsel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89 Dicx. L. Rev.
339, 347-50 (1974) [hereinafter Drechsel]. Drechsel discussed 35 cases which used intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against media defendants. Most of the time, the plaintiff alleged a defamation cause of action, as well as
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the plaintiffs tended to be successful at the trial level, only two of
the emotional distress claims were upheld on appeal. Id. at 346-47. See also Mead, Suing the Mass Media for Emotional
Distress: A Multi Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 NVASHBuRN L.J. 24 (1983). Mead performed a statistical
analysis of suits against the mass media. The results indicated that the number of suits alleging multiple causes of action
was increasing, while the number of claims alleging only defamation was steadily declining. Id. at 33-34. The increase
in the number of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims was seen as "significant." Id. at 43.
81. Drechsel, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Problems for the Mass Media, 12 PEPPERDiNE
L. Rev. 889 (1985).
82. Libel expert Bruce Sanford described intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the media as
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his or her intentional or reckless conduct which is extreme or outrageous. 83 In order
for liability to be established, the defendant's conduct must be "so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. '"84
Currently, the majority of states recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress
as an independent tort. 85
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims have been instituted against
media defendants for a variety of conduct.86 For example, the Second Circuit held
that a photographer's constant harrassment of Jacqueline Onassis and her children
was sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 87 The court reasoned that since the photographer's
conduct was sufficient to establish criminal liability for harrassment, it was
sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to support a civil action. 88 In another
successful intentional infliction of emotional distress suit against a media defendant,
the publication of a nude photograph falsely identified as the plaintiff was found to
constitute "conduct which exceed[ed] the bounds tolerated by a civilized society." 89
A New York court found that the defendant's knowing misidentification of the
photograph was sufficient to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 90
In contrast, a radio broadcast detailing alleged improprieties in a bankruptcy
court did not constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct and failed to support an
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action by the bankruptcy trustee. 91
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that the report
concerned matters of legitimate public interest and was published without actual
malice. 92 Therefore, the report "cannot be said to have been so extreme and
"lawsuits that try to make an end-run around the libel laws." Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1988, at 2, col. 2. See supra notes
80-81 and accompanying text. See also SMou.A, supra note 54, § 11.01(1).
83. RSTATL:ENr (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1966).
84. Id. at comment d.
85. At least 37 states recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claims. For a listing, see Note,
Minnesota's "New Tort": Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 10 WM. MrrcHE. L. REv. 349, 351-52 n.21
(1984).
86. E.g., Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (newspaper article falsely
connecting plaintiff's funeral home to a prostitution ring constituted "extreme and outrageous" conduct); Parnell v.
Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (newspaper photograph falsely implying that plaintiff was
a prostitute constituted "extreme and outrageous" conduct). Actual malice was not discussed in either case since both
plaintiffs were considered private figures. Cf. Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980) (newspaper photograph of
undercover narcotics officer with the caption "Know Your Enemies" did not constitute "extreme and outrageous"
conduct).
87. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 994 n.11.
89. Clifford v. Hollander, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2201, 2202 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). Cf. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib.
Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (no liability for publication of nude photograph
misidentified as public plaintiff because defendant's negligent investigation as to identity did not constitute actual malice).
90. Clifford v. Hollander, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2201, 2202 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). The defendant's testimony
that "he did not write the copy for the ... photograph and that [the plaintiff's] name, place of residence and occupation
only appeared by coincidence" was found to be not credible. Id. The court also found that he intentionally misidentified
the photograph in retaliation for an article written by the plaintiff which characterized him as a "gap-tooth, porno-film
maker." Id.
91. Dougherty v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
92. Id. at 1572-73.
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outrageous as to shock the public conscience, as is required for intentional infliction
of emotional distress." ' 93 However, the court did not say that, in the absence of a
finding of actual malice, a report never could be extreme and outrageous.
C. The Relationship Between Emotional Distress and Defamation
Since both severe emotional distress and reputational injury may arise from the
same publication, some commentators suggest that a defamed plaintiff could use the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action to circumvent the
traditional protections of the press provided by defamation law.94 In a defamation
claim, liability is based upon a finding of falsity and, if the plaintiff is a public figure
or a public official, a finding of the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of
falsity. Whereas, intentional infliction of emotional distress merely requires a finding
that the defendant's extreme and outrageous behavior caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress. Beyond basic differences of intent and falsity, there are less obvious
distinctions between the two claims: damages awardable, the length of the statutes of
limitation, and the applicability of common law defamation privileges. Because of
these differences, courts should not permit plaintiffs to substitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims where defamation claims would fail.
1. Intent
In a defamation cause of action brought by a public plaintiff, he or she must
prove that the defendant acted with the requisite subjective intent of actual malice.95
That is, the defendant must have acted with knowledge of the falsity or reckless
disregard of the falsity of the publication. 96 Actual malice is not a "reasonable
person" standard or a "should have known" standard. 97 If the publication is true,
there is no defamation liability, regardless of the plaintiff's status or the defendant's
knowledge. 98 The defendant's feelings about the plaintiff and motives for publishing
the allegedly defamatory statement are irrelevant in establishing constitutional
defamation liability99 since liability is not grounded in ill-will, hatred, spite, or intent
to cause harm. 10 Thus, the key issue in constitutional defamation is the defendant's
knowledge.
In an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the defendant is liable for
93. Id. at 1576.
94. See Drechsel, supra note 80, at 359-60. See also Note, First Amendment Limits on Torts Liability for Words
Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1778-85 (1985).
95. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
98. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1976) ("One who published a defamatory statement of fact is not
subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true."). Also, if the publication is an opinion, there is no defamation
liability ever. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
99. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1973); Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, (1970); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
100. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) ("even if [the speaker] did speak out of hatred, utterances
honestly believed contribute to the free exchange of ideas...").
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intentional or reckless conduct which reaches the "extreme and outrageous" level
and which results in severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.' 0' The intent
requirement here focuses on the defendant's state of mind or motive for acting in an
extreme and outrageous manner.10 2 The key issues in establishing intentional
infliction of emotional distress liability are (1) whether the defendant intended to
cause or recklessly acted to cause severe emotional distress and (2) whether severe
emotional distress was proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. 0 3 Intent to
cause injury is the gravamen of the emotional distress tort.10 4 Thus, the focus must
be whether the defendant intended to cause emotional injury.
2. Punitive Damages
One possible reason for the popularity of emotional distress causes of action is
the availability of punitive damages without proof of actual malice. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,105 the Supreme Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded
without proof of actual malice even in defamation actions brought by private
plaintiffs.10 6 Only a private plaintiff suing for "private issue" defamation may be
awarded punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. 0 7 However, in actions
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, like other "non-constitutionalized"
torts, punitive damages are permitted if the defendant acted with common law malice,
hatred, or ill-will.' 0 8 Often punitive damages constitute a major portion of the damage
award. ' 09
"[I]n cases raising first amendment issues, [the Supreme Court] repeatedly [has]
held that an appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independant examination
of the whole record' in order to make sure 'that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion into the field of free expression.' "110 Thus, jury awards in
101. RESTATENt~r (SEcoND) OF TogTs § 46 (1965).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988).
105. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
106. Id. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. For an extensive examination of the problems of punitive
damages in defamation litigation, see Winfield & Jollymore, Prospects, Remedies and Alternatives, in NEW YoRK TtmS
v. SuLwvL. THE N&%r TwENry YEAes 439-47 (R. Winfield ed. 1984).
107. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). See supra note 79 and accom-
panying text.
108. "'[W]here the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil or reprehensible motives,'
punitive damages are allowable 'not only to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others who might otherwise
be so prompted, from indulging in similar conduct in the future.'" Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 464, 471, 244
N.Y.S.2d 259, 265-66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (citations omitted).
Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), defamation was a matter of state tort law and
punitive damages were awardable pursuant to state law.
109. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876
(1988) fjury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages); Worldwide Church of God
v. MeNair, 805 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1986) (jury awarded $260,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages); Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1985) (jury awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages and $125,000
in punitive damages); Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (trial jury
awarded $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $2,500,000 in punitive damages; on appeal both awards were
determined excessive and a new trial was ordered unless plaintiff agreed to accept $400,000 compensatory damages and
punitive damages of $50,000 and $100,000 from defendant corporation and defendant author of publication respectively).
110. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
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defamation suits are subject to review for reasonableness"' and, frequently, are
reduced on review. 112 This reduction of awards on review protects media defendants
from large awards motivated by the jury's sympathy for the plaintiff or the
unpopularity of the defendant."13 Because large damage awards would lead to media
self-censorship, the practice of reducing awards on review prevents such awards from
having a chilling effect on the press. "14
Since fundamental first amendment concerns generally are not expected to
appear in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, there is not the same
predilection to review damage awards in emotional distress cases. Punitive damages
are regarded as "private fines" imposed by juries "to punish reprehensive conduct
and deter its future occurrence."' 15 Juries are given wide discretion in setting these
awards," 6 which are only disturbed on review if they are blatantly "excessive."" 7
Therefore, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims may provide a defamed
plaintiff with a larger award of punitive damages, which is less likely to be disturbed
on review, without requiring the plaintiff to meet the constitutional standard of actual
malice.
3. Statutes of Limitation
Another possible reason for the increased use of intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims by defamation plaintiffs is an attempt to extend the statutes
of limitation provided by state defamation law. While the statutes of limitation for
defamation claims generally are very short-usually one to two years," 8 many states
111. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
112. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.denied, CBS,
Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988) (jury award of $3,000,000 compensatory damages
reduced by judge to $1 raised to $1,000,000 on appeal).
113. "[Juries] remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views .... Jury
discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Punitive damages must bear some relationship to the defendant's culpability. See Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19
A.D.2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
117. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
118. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-8(k) (Supp. 1987) (2 years); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.10.070(1) (1982) (2 years); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-541(1) (1982) (1 year); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104 (Michie 1987) (slander I year), § 16-56-105 (1987)
(libel 3 years); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1988) (1 year); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103 (1987) (1 year);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-597 (West 1960) (2 years); DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8119 (1974) (2 years); D.C. CooE
ANN. § 12-301(4) (1981) (1 year); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (1982) (1 year); HAw. REv. STAT. § 657-4 (1985) (2 years);
IDAHO CODE § 5-219(5) (1979) (2 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-201 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (1 year); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-2-2(1) (Burns Supp. 1986) (2 years); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.1(2) (Vest Supp. 1988) (2 years); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-514(1) (1988) (1 year); KY. REv. STAT. § 413.140(d) (Supp. 1983) (1 year); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West
Supp. 1988) (1 year); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (Supp. 1988) (2 years); Mo. Crs. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN.
§ 5-105 (1984) (1 year); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5805(7) (West Supp. 1986) (1 year); MmN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.07(1) (West Supp. 1988) (2 years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (2 years); MoNr. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2-204(3) (1987) (2 years); NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 25-208 (1943, reissued 1985) (1 year); Nsv. REv. STAT. § 11.190(4)(c)
(Supp. 1987) (2 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1987) (1 year); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 215(3) (McKinney
1978) (1 year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3) (1987) (1 year); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(1) (Supp. 1987) (2 years); Otno
REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (1 year); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(4) (West Supp. 1988)
(I year); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.120(2) (Butterworth 1988) (1 year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5523(1) (Purdon Supp.
1987) (1 year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-550(l) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (2 years); S.D. COMED LAws ANN. § 15-2-15(1)
(Supp. 1984) (2 years); TENN. CODE Ar. § 28-3-103 (1980) (slander 6 months), § 28-3-104(a) (1980) (libel I year); TEx.
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provide the same statute of limitation for defamation claims as they have for
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 119 When the time limits have
differed, some courts have applied the shorter defamation statute of limitation to
claims for emotional distress arising from tortious publication. Although New Jersey
had a six-year statute of limitation for intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims, the District Court for New Jersey applied the one-year defamation statute of
limitation to an emotional distress claim which arose from tortious publication in
MacDonald v. Time.' 20 The New Jersey court reasoned that since the emotional
distress claim arose directly from libel and was based on identical facts, the gravamen
of the complaint was defamation. 121 The court held that the shorter statute of
limitation for defamation should apply. 122 Therefore, the inclusion of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress cause of action did not preserve or resurrect an expired
defamation claim.
4. Defamation Privileges
Along with its constitutional restrictions, defamation liability is limited by
several privileges relating to publication. 123 While those privileges concerning
judicial and legislative proceedings are absolute defenses to a defamation cause of
action, 124 most other privileges, such as the privilege of "neutral reportage,"
constitute conditional defenses. 125 These privileges are defenses to defamation causes
STAT. ANN. art. 5524(l) (Vernon 1958) (1 year); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (1987) (1 year); VA. CODE § 8.01-248
(1984) (1 year); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.100(1) (1962) (2 years); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(b) (1981) (1 year); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.57 (West 1983) (2 years); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(v)(A) (1977) (1 year).
But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-1 1(3)(o) (West 1988) (4 years); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988) (3 years); N.H. REy. STAT. ANN. § 508:4(H) (1987) (3 years); R.I. GEu. LAws § 9-1-14 (1956, reenacted 1985)
(slander 1 year, libel 3 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512(3) (1986) (3 years).
119. Of those states which recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action, those
which have the same statute of limitation for emotional distress as for defamation claims include: ALA. CODE § 6-2-38k
(1975) (2 years); ARK. CODE ANN. § 37-2113 (1987) (1 year-same as slander, 2 years shorter than libel); CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1988) (1 year); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp. 1988) (2 years); IowA CODE
ANN. § 614.1(3) (West Supp. 1988) (2 years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(2) (1983) (1 year); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 260,
§ 4 (Law. Co-op. 1988) (3 years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1987) (1 year); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978)
(3 years); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (1 year); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3) (Supp. 1987)
(1 year); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson Supp. 1983) (1 year); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a) (1980) (1
year-same as libel; but see § 28-3-103 (slander 6 months)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (Supp. 1987) (1 year); WASH.
RE. CODE ANN. § 4.16.100(1) (Supp. 1987) (2 years); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.57 (West. 1983) (2 years).
States having longer statutes of limitation for intentional infliction of emotional distress than for defamation include:
ARiz. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(1) (1987) (2 years-I year longer); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981) (3 years-2
years longer); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (1982) (2 years-I year longer); KY. REv. STAT. § 413.120 (Supp. 1988) (5
years-4 years longer); Mic. CO.iw. LAws ANN. § 600.5805(8) (West Supp. 1986) (3 years-2 years longer); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987) (2 years-i year longer); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95-3 (Supp. 1988) (2 years-I year
longer); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.110(1) (Butterworth 1988) (2 years-I year longer); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (6 years-4 years longer); VA. CODE § 8.01-243-A (1984) (2 years-I year longer); W. VA.
CODE § 55-2-12(b) (1981) (2 years-1 year longer).
But cf., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104 (1987) (1 year-2 years shorter than libel statute of limitation but the same
as the slander statute of limitation).
120. 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1981 (D.N.J. 1981).
121. Id. at 1983-84.
122. Id. at 1984.
123. See RESTATEm rr (SEcoND) O TORTS §§ 582-612 (1976) (defenses to actions for defamation).
124. See generally id. at §§ 585-592A (absolute privileges).
125. Id. at § 611. The privilege of neutral reportage denies defamation recovery for the publication of defamatory
matters in a report of an official proceeding. However, such a report is privileged only if it is an "accurate and complete
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of action but are not necessarily applicable to claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 126 In Katchig v. Boothe,127 an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim did not prevent the use of the privilege which protects a witness who
published defamatory matters within the scope of a trial. 128 In Lerette v. Dean Witter
Organization, Inc., 29 a California appellate court went further, holding that a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be based on
defamatory communications made prior to trial but logically connected with the
lawsuit, since such communications were privileged under California law. 130 The
court refused to permit a "judicially derived cause of action" to defeat the "clear
legislative intention" of the privilege because it would operate to deter otherwise
protected communications. 13 1
The function of defamation privileges is to protect individuals who publish
defamatory materials in situations where the need for a free flow of information
outweighs the interest in protecting individual reputations. Those courts which have
applied the privileges to emotional distress causes of action have relied on the fact
that the source of the emotional distress was the publication of defamatory matters. 132
Since the essence of such claims was tortious publication, the use of the defamation
privileges provided the defendants with the same protection available in a traditional
defamation action. Therefore, selective pleading of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim does not result in the imposition of liability for the
publication of traditionally privileged material.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DisTREss
CLAIMS AFTER HUSTLER MAGAzNE v. FALWELL
In many ways Hustler Magazine v. Falwell' 33 was the proverbial "easy case."
Given the consistency of the precedents establishing and expanding the actual malice
standard, 134 it was extremely unlikely that the Court would have upheld any recovery
by a public figure such as Falwell absent a finding of actual malice. 135 What is
... [report] or a fair abridgement" of the proceeding. Id. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 488 (1976) (selection
of one possible interpretation of an ambiguous court order did not constitute a fair abridgement); Schiavone Constr. Co.
v. Time, Inc., 735 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984) (a report is a fair abridgement if the report and the original document have
"equal sting"). This privilege protects fair and accurate reports which are both newsworthy and the subject of raging
controversy. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring newsworthiness in
order for privilege to be applied); Lasky v. American Broadcast Companies, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(requiring raging controversy).
126. See REsrATEmErT (SEcoND) OF TORTS ch. 25, scope note at 239 (1976) (the scope of these privileges is limited
to defamation actions).
127. 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
128. Id. at 640-41, Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
129. 60 Cal. App. 3d 575, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
130. Id. at 577, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (California follows the Restatement of Torts § 586 comment A which extends
the privilege to "communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding." Id.).
131. Id. at 579, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
132. See supra notes 127-31.
133. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
134. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 14. The actual malice issue could have been avoided entirely if it had been possible to label
Falwell a private person. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (The plaintiff, a Palm Beach socialite
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somewhat suprising is the scope of Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and its
sweeping support of the actual malice standard. Since the jury found that the ad
parody could not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about
[Falwell] or actual events in which [he] participated," ' 36 and therefore was not a
statement of fact, 137 the Court was not obligated to reach the actual malice issue. 138
Yet, Rehnquist's opinion makes the actual malice standard applicable to claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 139
While the Court did not take the next step advocated by Judge Wilkinson' 40 and
deny public plaintiffs any recovery for "hurt feelings,"' 4 1 the Court clearly
diminished the possibility of successful emotional distress claims by public figures.
By requiring the public plaintiff to prove that the statement was both "factual" and
made with actual malice, the Court limited one potential "end-run" around the first
amendment. 42 At least for public plaintiffs, the Court's decision reduces the
likelihood of recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress where a cause of
action for defamation would not lie. Since defamation awards may be based on
emotional injury alone,' 43 it is difficult to think of many situations where a public
plaintiff could establish intentional infliction of emotional distress but not defama-
tion. Perhaps the only remaining use for emotional distress claims based on offensive
publication brought by public figures is those situations where the plaintiff, who
established actual malice and the factual nature of the statement, cannot establish the
common law elements of defamation: publication of a defamatory statement
concerning the plaintiff which caused actual injury to his or her reputation.44 It is
possible that a public plaintiff could establish emotional distress liability without
establishing "publication,"' 145 such as where the defendant made the offensive
statement directly to the plaintiff alone.146
The Court had no opportunity to discuss whether the Falwell decision should be
read to require a showing of actual malice in order for a private plaintiff to recover
punitive damages for emotional distress due to an offensive "public issue"
publication. 147 However, since the state interest in protecting the reputations of
private citizens does not outweigh the first amendment interest in preventing
who was involved in a hotly contested divorce and had held several news conferences during the divorce, was found to
be a private person.).
136. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (quoting Appendix Cl to the Petition for Certiorari).
137. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
138. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (White, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484, 484-89 (4th Cir. 1986)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
141. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
142. See supra note 82.
143. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
144. RESTATLmENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976).
145. See supra note 38.
146. Publication to a third party is required to establish a defamation cause of action. RaSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 577(1) comment b (1976). See Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (no publication if defamatory
writing read by no one but the defamed).
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 76-79 and 105-07 and accompanying text.
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self-censorship due to fears of high punitive damage awards in defamation claims, 148
it is unlikely that this balance would be different merely because the claim was for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, in the near future "public issue"
private plaintiffs may be unable to recover punitive damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress without showing both actual malice and the factual nature of the
statement.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutionalization of the tort of defamation which began twenty-four
years ago with the New York Times Co. v. Sullivant49 decision now has spread to the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The imposition of the actual malice
requirement on public plaintiffs in emotional distress claims is an attempt to properly
balance the first amendment interest in an uninhibited press with the state's legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens from emotional injury. Whether this requirement will
adequately protect political satire remains to be seen. However, the Supreme Court's
reaffirmation of the protection provided by the actual malice standard clearly shows
that this constitutionalization is a permanent fixture in modern tort law.
Alicia J. Bentley
148. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See supra notes 76-79 and 105-07 and accompanying text.
149. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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